In fairness to Rapoport, he noted that there were other groups, for example the Ku Klux Klan between 1865 and 1876, which employed terrorist violence and yet did not fit neatly into his template. However, he essentially dismissed such examples as statistical outliers that had little impact of the development of terrorism as a phenomenon over time. 6 He also observed that some groups within each wave had non-dominant characteristics in common with groups in the other waves. For example, the Provisional IRA of the 1970s and 1980s was both nationalist and Marxist. But the deeper one explores Rapoport's theory, the more difficult it becomes to escape the suspicion that he took the analogy of the wave too far. He describes each wave as having an international character "driven by a predominant energy that shapes the participating groups' characteristics and mutual relationships." 7 This results in "a cycle of activity in a given time period… characterized by expansion and contraction phases." 8 But is this really what happens? We find particularly problematic Rapoport's assertion that "when a wave's energy cannot inspire new organizations, the wave disappears". 9 Indeed, there is very little evidence that the activities associated with any of his four waves have actually disappeared, and there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that each type of terrorism has deeper historical roots than his wave theory suggests.
It is our contention that the strategic and tactical choices terrorist organizations make play an important role in the evolution of terrorism. Even isolated outbreaks of terrorist violence can influence the choices made by later terrorist groups. To be sure, like other political organizations, terrorists learn first and foremost from their immediate rivals and other likeminded groups. 10 However, there is also considerable evidence of consistent and dynamic exchange of ideas between terrorist groups of markedly different character that stretches back several decades further than Rapoport suggests, to the middle of the Nineteenth Century. While Rapoport's theory provides a simple and conceptually clean narrative to help students and researchers alike to organize their thoughts, there are simply too many anomalies. More significantly, some of these outlying cases have been very influential in the sense that they provided important lessons or inspiration for later terrorist groups (including the main groups in each of Rapoport's waves) and thus played an integral role in the evolution of terrorism over the past 150 years.
We therefore propose an alternative framework for analysis, based on the idea that terrorism comes in four different strains and that there is an important element of "contagion" both within and between these separate strains. We believe that it may even be possible to identify a 'patient zero' for each strain -an individual who either through advocacy or example first promoted the innovative adoption of terrorist methods to advance a particular political cause. The concept of four strains fits the historical record better, and more plausibly explains how terrorism spreads and evolves from one conflict to the next.
The four strains we have identified all date from the same period, and although they have mostly developed separately since, they do occasionally combine and mutate.
These four strains -these four horsemen of terrorism -are nationalism, socialism, religious extremism and social exclusion. Using Boaz Ganor's definition of terrorism -"the intentional use of or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims" -as our criteria, we have compared both theories against the historical record to determine which ultimately offers the greater theoretical leverage over recorded events.
Terrorist Groups as Learning Organizations
There is a rich sociological literature on how and under what context organizations learn from their peers and rivals, associated with scholars such as Barbara Levitt and James G. March. 11 Non-state organizations learn both from direct experience and from the stories they develop to make sense of that experience, as well as from experiences and stories generated by peers. Organizations that interact regularly with direct competitors learn from both their own and their rivals' successes. The fields of anthropology and communication studies have generated similar theories about the contagiousness of ideas to explain the diffusion of innovative practices across societies. 12 Analyzing how West European conservative parties had learned from the successful post-war initiatives of Social Democrats to revitalize their own electoral programs, party organizations and electoral strategy, Maurice Duverger labeled this "contagion from the left". 13 A few decades later, it would be the centreleft parties that "modernized" through a process of "contagion from the right". 14 The German terrorism expert Peter Waldmann was one of the first to reference this kind of "contagion effect" for terrorist groups, arguing that the apparent success of some groups attracted others to emulate aspects of their approach, and perhaps also their ideology. 15 Indeed, several early modern terrorists actually expressed the hope that they would set an example for others to emulate. As the Russian populist Nikolai
Morozov observed in The Terrorist Struggle: "When a handful of people appears to represent the struggle of a whole nation and is triumphant over millions of enemies, then the idea of terroristic struggle will not die once it is clarified for the people and proven it can be practical." 16 Propaganda by the deed -the very notion that acts of terrorism would be a better way to spread ideas than mere written propaganda -was based on the hope that terrorism would prove a contagious idea. 17 The main causal mechanism in Rapoport's work, as in Huntington's, is historical context. The first, anarchist, wave emerged with new technological developments that made travel and communication easier, and in turn made it easier for ideas and doctrines to be transmitted across boundaries. In Rapoport's words: "A wave by definition is a historical event", sparked or shaped by international wars or peace agreements. 18 Huntington was more explicit about the causes for waves of democratization: global economic growth, economic and military failure in dictatorships, changes in the policies of external actors (such as the superpowers), and a "snowballing effect" where early events provided models and inspiration for later events in the same wave. 19 In both cases radical movements and organizations learn from their contemporaries, but the spread of both ideology and tactics is limited to a given time and space. A simple extension of this idea is that each wave of terrorism is characterized by a common narrative about the enemy -authoritarian monarchies, empires, capitalist democracies and secular states -and a common international legal and political regime -the concert of Europe, the age of empire, the Cold War, and the post-cold war "globalization" era. Indeed, the wave metaphor can even be extended to counter-terrorism strategies. 20 The central point about contagion or organizational learning is that it assigns more weight to the active role that terrorists and their organizations play in the process whereby ideas and practices "travel" across boundaries: much like Huntington's dictators, terrorist groups sometimes cooperate with each other, and much more frequently learn from or imitate each other. The sociologists Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell examined a series of ways organizations can come to resemble each other (the process of isomorphism), including responding to similar conditions, learning from and imitating each other, and interacting with each other and establishing common norms. 21 Although terrorist organizations are usually autonomous and isolated (even more so than dictators), and therefore less subject to pressure from society and competitors than many other organizations, it is clear that learning and copying has been an important factor in shaping similarities across organizations both in terms of strategy and tactics.
There is a great deal of qualitative evidence in the historical record of the diffusion or transfer of ideas between different terrorist and insurgent actors, often across wide temporal and geographic distances. For example, the Irish revolutionary Michael
Collins, who is often seen as one of the key architects of modern urban terrorism although he personally eschewed acts of indiscriminative violence, 22 wrote an appreciative letter to the Boer commander Christiaan de Wet thanking him for being his "earliest inspiration". 23 Collins also spoke of his admiration for the Finnish nationalist Eugen Schauman who assassinated the Russian Governor General of Finland, Nicholai Bobrikov, in 1904. 24 We also know from the Irish nationalist O'Donovan Rossa's private correspondence that he was well aware of the attempt by Narodnaya Volya to assassinate Tsar Alexander II by bombing the Winter Palace in The Al Qaeda ideologue Mustafa Setmarian Nasar -perhaps best known by his alias Abu Mus'ab al-Suri -employed the nom de plume 'Castro'. 34 Although he mourned the creation of the State of Israel, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb urged his fellow Islamists to learn from the success that the Jewish terrorist groups LEHI and Irgun Zvi Leumi had enjoyed influencing British policy in Palestine. 35 Arafat cited the relationship between the Haganah and Irgun as a model for the PLO -Fatah structure. 36 The French Organization of the Secret Army (OAS) formed in 1961 by disgruntled military veterans of the Algerian conflict was modeled on the image of its main adversary, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). 37 This kind of policy transfer can also take place directly, in the shape of training, even between what might seem at first sight to be ill-matched groups, such as the Japanese activists from the Occupied Territories, to Marj al Zahour in Southern Lebanon. 39 Despite Hamas and PIJ both being Sunni organizations, the activists were taken in by the Shia Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah and provided with aid and operational training (including the use of explosives). Although many of those expelled from Israeli-controlled territory had been intellectuals and ideologues rather than frontline fighters, on their return to the Occupied Territories in September 1993 many took a more active part in hostilities and several were linked to suicide bombings by the Israeli authorities -a tactic that had not previously been used by Palestinian groups. 40 On 19 October 1994 Saleh al-Souwi boarded a bus in Tel Aviv carrying a bomb concealed in a brown bag that he then detonated, taking twenty-two civilian lives along with his own and injuring fifty others, making it the worst bomb attack in Israeli history up until that point. The following day a public announcement was read out in mosques across the Gaza in which Hamas boasted that the attack had been carried out using knowledge and techniques learned directly from Hezbollah. 41 In short, we know from both terrorists and analysts that terrorist groups actively and deliberately learn from each other. Not only ideology, but also strategy (elaboration of what a group's goal should be and how it is best pursued) and tactics (how to turn strategy into practice) are often shaped by other terrorists groups' experience. While direct learning, in the shape of training and support, might be limited to contemporary groups, it is clear than a number of terrorists have found inspiration in older groups or even adopted models from rival or opposing organizations Ulysses S. Grant in City Point, Virginia, which killed more than fifty people in August 1864. 43 The sudden availability of powerful, affordable, portable and concealable weapons -which could also be easily acquired or manufactured by private citizenswould prove to be significant force multiplier for states and non-state actors alike.
The second development was the development of new mass communication technologies that allowed knowledge of ideas and events to be rapidly distributed across thousands of miles, and enabled individuals to travel easily across borders, and even across oceans, in larger numbers than ever before opening up an era of mass migration and commensurate dislocation. The first working telegraph was built between Washington DC and Baltimore by Samuel Morse (who also developed Morse code to aid the transmission of messages) becoming operational in 1844. The laying of the first transatlantic telegraph cable was completed in 1858 44 and the use of the telegraph by the print media really took off in the 1860s when newspaper offices like the Scotsman and the London Times began to install telegraph lines in their newsrooms so that they could receive news rapidly from national capitals and overseas correspondents. 45 The steam powered rotary printing press invented in the United States in 1843 allowed for the reproduction of millions of copies of page of text in a single day. 46 On land, the world's first commercial railway, the Stockton and Malatesta acknowledged the debt he and his followers owed to the heroes of the Risorgimento, noting that the First International taught its members nothing that had not already been learned from Orsini, Mazzini and Garibaldi. 50 This was certainly Orsini's intention, he published two volumes of memoirs and a number of political pamphlets based on his career as a revolutionary during his lifetime, including one with an appendix entitled How to Conspire. 51 In Europe, the revolutions of 1848-49 and the Paris Commune raised the hopes of a range of radical groups that social change might be achieved, but some individuals and groups concluded from these events (together with the failed efforts of Russian populists to educate and mobilize the rural population in the 1870s) that more dramatic action -terrorism -would be required. In the USA the tensions surrounding the Civil War played a similar role. In Europe, radicals that were on the losing side in 1848-49 and 1871 turned to terrorism; in the USA it was the opponents of slavery before the outbreak of the Civil War (John Brown), and many on the losing side afterwards (the Ku Klux Klan). In Europe this gave rise to anarchist and nationalist terrorism in the second half of the Nineteenth Century; in the USA it gave rise to religious and exclusivist terrorism.
The Nineteenth Century brought together the means, the motive and the opportunity for small bands of committed radicals to take the fight to the established order and men of all political stripes were quick to realize the game-changing tools that the march of science had placed in the hands of their followers. Rapoport dates his first wave of terrorism as beginning in the 1880s but as early as the 1850s and 1860s we can see nationalists, populists (perhaps a more accurately inclusive label for the disparate 'old left' groups of Rapoport's "first wave" than anarchism), exclusionists, and religious extremists begin to explore the possibilities that these new tools had to offer. The 'patients zero' of this viral metaphor, as best we have been able to establish, are the Italian nationalist Felice Orsini, the German populist Karl Heinzen, the former Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest and the American abolitionist John Brown.
Nationalist Terrorism -from Felice Orsini to the Tamil Tigers
Felice Orsini was an associate of the Italian statesman Giuseppe Mazzini and a supporter of Italian unification, to which Napoleon III was perceived as an obstacle.
In a transnational conspiracy, which saw Orsini build and test a contact bomb of his own devising in England before traveling to Paris, Orsini and his Italian coconspirators planned to bomb the Emperor's coach as he drove to the opera on the evening of 14 January 1858. Three 'Orsini' bombs, employing fulminate of mercury as an explosive, detonated killing and injuring a number of onlookers in the crowd but leaving Napoleon and his entourage essentially unharmed. Injured in the blasts, Orsini was detained before he could make good his escape and was ultimately sent to the guillotine. 52 In the end, Italy's path to unification would be driven in large part by the actions of regular and irregular forces, rather than clandestine groups, and the torch of and wrongfully endangering the public peace. 59 Marx and Engels were also well acquainted with Heinzen's work -with Engels in particular going out of his way to disparage Heinzen in the British press. 60 It was another associate of Marx and Engels, the Russian anarchist philosopher Mikhail Bakunin, who working with a radical Russian student Sergei Nechaev, helped to lay the foundation for one of the first leftist terror groups, Nechaev's Narodnaya Rasprava (The People's Retribution), briefly active in 1869. Narodnaya Rasprava would partially inspire the creation of a far better organized clandestine populist group, Narodnaya Volya in 1879. 61 It was Narodnaya Volya that succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Leftist terrorism would continue in Russia until the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution, and it is worth recalling that Lenin's elder brother, Aleksander, was executed in 1887 because of his association with Narodnaya Volya plot to kill Tsar Alexander III. Anarchist terrorism would become a worldwide phenomenon. In September 1883 a ring of conspirators, led by the self- Delhi while the chamber was in session. 64 To all intents and purposes Rapoport's third wave of 'new left' terrorism is really just the uninterrupted evolution of the 'old left' activity he groups together as his first wave. In Russia, the Social Revolutionary Party picked up the thread from Narodnaya Volya after the repression of student rebellions at the turn of the century, and again after the aborted revolution of 1905-06, 65 and many of the practitioners of terrorism on the left lent their skills to the new regime's "red terror" after the 1917 revolution. 66 The Communist International (or Comintern) became at the same time the instrument and the victim of Stalin's terror outside Russia. 67 The lessons Mao Tse Christian faith, Brown's avowed intent was to "make an example, and so strike terror" in the hopes of stampeding proslavery civilians into leaving the Kansas territory. 70 When Brown led his raid on the federal armory in Harpers Ferry in October 1859 he hoped -like so many of the men and women of violence that would come after himhis small band would inspire others to rise up by their example and take back their freedom using the weapons from the armory. Brown and his men seized the armory and took thirty-five local inhabitants hostage. The hoped-for uprising did not transpire and a federal force -ironically enough led by the future Confederate Commander-in-Chief Robert E. Lee -captured Brown, killed ten of his men, including two of his sons, and freed their hostages. Brown was swiftly put on trial, which he used as platform to proclaim his views, and then executed. As befitted a man who had admonished his followers "to take more care to end life well than to live long", 71 Brown went to scaffold quite cheerfully, embracing martyrdom. Max Boot has described Brown as "one of the more consequential terrorists in history" quoting Frederick Douglass' epitaph: "If John Brown did not end the war that ended slavery, he did at least begin the war that ended slavery." 72 Henry David Thoreau said of his execution: "Some eighteen hundred years ago, Christ was crucified; This morning, perchance, Captain Brown was hung.... He is not Old Brown any longer; he is an angel of light." 73 The religious strain lay dormant for more than half a century before emerging once more, but in the interim religious belief certainly impacted other strains. For example, Walter Laqueur traces many of the important ideas about justifiable tyrannicide in anarchist and early nationalist terrorism to Christian thought, even though terrorists like Heinzen emphasized the distinction between the two doctrines. 74 Religion was an important factor in Irish nationalism -with the Easter Uprising in 1916 Padraig Pearse and his confederates explicitly set out to establish what he termed "a theology of insurrection" and the choice of Easter Monday for the rising was also deliberate in this regard, with its connotations of sacrifice and resurrection. 75 The action of the British authorities only served to amplify this effect. As the Provisional IRA intelligence officer Eamon Collins would write more than eighty years later: "In my mind, Pearse and [James] Connolly were all linked together. They were martyrs for our Catholic faith, the true religion: religion and politics fused together by the blood of the martyrs. I was prepared to be martyr, to die for this Catholic faith." 76 The American Marxist terror group the Weather Underground would also later name one of its publications Osawatomie, after a town in Kansas that John Brown had tried to defend against pro-Slavery raiders in 1856. 77 The first modern Islamist revival movement, the Society of the Muslim Brothers or Muslim Brotherhood, would reactivate the strain and putting faith at the heart of politics. Qutb's personal lawyer and the executor of his will. 85 The Muslim Brotherhood would become the inspiration for a number of more recent Islamist terrorist organizations. Ayman Al Zawahiri published a study of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1991 entitled The Bitter Harvest, which, though critical, also illustrates the conceptual debt Al Qaeda owes the Brotherhood. 86 The Muslim Brotherhood's unique combination of militancy and social service provision has also been widely copied, including by terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
Service provision creates its own dynamic strengthening bonds between armed groups and their constituents, but also creates obligations. As the Deputy SecretaryGeneral of Hezbollah, Naim Qassem, explained in his memoirs: "Social work serves to enrich supporters' confidence in the viability of the Party's causes and course, as it cooperates, collaborates and joins forces to remain strong and tenacious in its political and resistance roles." 87 Rapoport dates the beginning of his fourth, religious, wave to the upheavals that 
Conclusion -The Four Horsemen Ride
Rapoport's Four Waves of Modern Terrorism is the field of terrorism studies' equivalent of Francis Fukuyama's essay on The End of History. It is thoughtprovoking and conceptually useful. However, while at first glance it seems to fit the facts, the reality is messier and more prosaic. There are no waves of modern terrorism -there are simply numerous situations around the world where the means, motive and opportunity to seek political change through violence have given rise to terrorist actors motivated by one or more of the four strains outlined above.
The truth is that we are living in an age of terrorism, and have been for a century and a half. Modern terrorism is a product of the dramatic changes in weapons technology and mass communications in the Nineteenth Century and the development of radical ideologies that inspired revolutionary groups to experiment with new forms of political violence. The four strains of modern terrorism all have their roots in this confluence of means and motive. Technological and ideational developments made modern terrorism, technological and ideological change drove developments in the four strains during the Twentieth Century, and technological and ideological change is likely to shape their future trajectories.
Terrorist groups come in many shapes and sizes, and they evolve and mutate. Jessica Stern coined the phrase 'the Protean enemy' -after the shape-shifting Greek sea god featured in Homer's Odyssey -to describe the challenge posed by terrorism because of the constantly changing nature of the groups involved and the changing nature of threat itself. 103 Terrorism is not, and will never be, a conceptually clean label. As Rapoport has noted, terrorists are complex actors that may simultaneously inhabit multiple identities 104 -terrorist and drug trafficker, terrorist and freedom fighter, terrorist and revolutionary, Marxist and nationalist -but at their core all the groups featured in this article all have one thing in common: they are prepared to indiscriminately and violently target civilians for political gain.
The four strains differ fundamentally in ideology. Some of the organizations cited in this article used terrorism as one of several tactics, but for many, terrorism became their central, defining characteristic: a strategy that defined what their goals were and how these were to be achieved. There is ample evidence that they have learned from each other. Judging by what the terrorists themselves claim, contagion (or learning) seems to have been somewhat stronger within each strain than across strains. But it must also be acknowledged that in many cases ideas jumped across both generations and ideologies.
All four strains have proven resilient, despite the ideological and technological revolutions of the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries. Today, in some respects, the social and political space in which to operate as a terrorist actor is shrinking. For example, emerging technologies like facial recognition, social media, robotics, predictive algorithms, artificial intelligence, and genetic marking will make it harder and harder for individuals or small groups to operate off the grid. In other respects, with the rise of failed states and the "feral cities" that counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen warns of in Out of the Mountains, their space to operate might be increasing. 105 The question about the future threat of terrorism is not so much whether and when a new wave might emerge, as how changing geopolitics, ideology and technology might affect each of the four strains and whether they might mutate into new forms of political violence.
